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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the roles of business group affiliations and whether the size and 
ownership structure of business groups influence the performance outcomes of 
diversification among family-controlled firms in Malaysia. It presents evidence that 
agency-driven and thus performance-diminishing firm diversification is more likely to 
take place in firms affiliated with a family-controlled business group than in independent 
firms. The findings support the hypothesis that if the benefits of diversification can be 
captured through group-level diversification, then diversification at the firm level is more 
of an act of expropriation. In Malaysia, the undue political interference in business that 
to a certain extent has contributed to a weak enforcement of rules causes the enhanced 
control of family ownership through the formation of large and structurally complicated 
business groups to go unchecked. This grants the controlling families opportunities to 
pursue sub-optimal firm diversification policies that bring them more self-interested 
benefits at the expense of firm performance.     
  
Keywords: family-controlled business groups, firm performance, group size, group 
structure, agency problems, firm diversification  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As in many other East Asian countries, the majority of firms in Malaysia are 
highly concentrated in their ownership structure, and families are the most 
common type of controlling shareholders (World Bank, 2005). A controlling 
shareholder is the largest shareholder that has the capacity to influence the 
policies and course of action of the firm. It is reported that about two-thirds of the 
publicly listed firms in Malaysia have a family as the controlling shareholder 
(Haslindar & Fazilah, 2009). Controlling families generally enhance their private 
benefits by engaging in non-value maximisation policy- or strategy-related 
activities (Shleifer &Vishny, 1997).  
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The formation of business groups and firm diversification are two such 
activities that could be part of the strategy of controlling families to facilitate 
their expropriation activities and strengthen their power for further expropriation. 
Put differently, business group affiliation and firm diversification are among the 
corporate governance issues underlying concentrated ownership structures that 
are specific to Asia or at least more important in Asia (Claessens & Fan, 2002).  
 
In Malaysia, a family-controlled business group is formed when two or 
more publicly listed firms are simultaneously controlled by the same family 
(Claessens, Fan, & Lang, 2006; Zuaini & Napier, 2006). In the business group, 
each firm still enjoys a certain amount of autonomy, such as having its own board 
of directors and its own management team as well as its own shareholder base 
(Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). It is thus different from the conglomerate type of 
business organisation found in the United States whereby the various subordinate 
businesses do not have such autonomy. 
 
The opportunity to form a low transparency of sprawling, loosely 
affiliated business groups makes it difficult to determine where control resides 
and identify and challenge unjust intra-group transactions (transactions between 
member firms of the group) in which "such networks provide significant 
opportunity for collusion or other unethical transactions" (Young, Peng, 
Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Yi, 2008, p. 206). The expanded control (over a number of 
publicly listed member firms) made possible by business groups increases the 
chances of controlling families to engage in diversification activities that only 
benefit themselves without much consideration of the impact on, and often at the 
expense of, the rest of the shareholders. The larger and the more complicated the 
structure of a business group, the more serious the problem may be. This is 
especially true in a country such as Malaysia, where it is widely known that the 
controlling families of many business groups, particularly the large and complex 
ones, have close relationships with the ruling party or senior government officials 
(Gomez & Jomo, 1999; Gomez, 2006).  
 
Family-controlled business groups in Malaysia often operate across a 
diversified range of activities within a sector as well as across many sectors as 
diverse as plantation, manufacturing, trading, services, construction and property 
development (Thillainathan, 1999). Diversification is thus a way for a firm to 
expand and become larger in Malaysia, and, as mentioned above, larger firms 
stand a better chance to form 'relationships' with political figures and 'work 
together' with them for quid-pro-quo benefits (for instance, receiving political 
patronage for controlling shareholders and funds for politicians and their ruling 
political party). The information compiled by Gomez and Jomo (1999) shows 
that many of the firms that are politically well connected to high-ranking political 
figures are larger firms or business groups that are widely diversified.   
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Moreover, the controlling shareholders of business groups are more 
likely to engage in self-interested and dubious diversification activities, as their 
close connection with the ruling party can shield them from the risk of any 
serious legal punishment from regulators (Gomez, 2006; Gunasegaram, 2007; 
Berkman, Cole, & Fu, 2010). Qian, Pan and Yeung (2010) find that firms with 
political connections perform more poorly than do firms without such 
connections because controlling shareholders who have political connections 
"steal more than political ties can bring in" (p. 5).    
 
 
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
 
From the discussion in the above section, this study aims to achieve the following 
two-fold objectives for publicly listed family-controlled firms in Malaysia: 
 
(i) To examine the importance of group affiliation in influencing the 
performance outcomes of firm diversification (Hypothesis 1).  
 
(ii) To examine the moderating influence of group heterogeneity (group 
size and group complexity) on the firm diversification-performance 
relationship (Hypotheses 2a–2b).   
 
The conceptualisation of the study and the relationship between the 
objectives of the study and the hypotheses can be seen in the flowchart diagram 
of the conceptual research framework in Figure 1. The diagram depicts the main 
and moderating variables involved in the study and their influences on firm 
performance, as indicated by the numbered hypothesis. The development of the 
hypotheses as numbered in the diagram is explained and justified in the 
hypothesis development section.  
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Figure 1. Conceptual framework of the study 
 
Notes: 
1. Arrows  (            ) from the main (moderating) variables indicate that the variables are hypothesised 
as having an influence (moderating influence) on firm performance. 
2. Solid lines joining two variables (              ) indicate an association between the variables.  
3. H: hypothesis 
  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
 
Roles of Business Groups in Firm Diversification 
 
Chakrabarti, Singh and Mahmood (2007), who examine the efficiency and 
performance outcomes of firm diversification between group-affiliated firms and 
non-group firms in six East Asian countries, state that: 
 
group affiliation often affects the outcomes of diversification. In most cases, the 
outcomes of diversification differ significantly, though not in a consistent 
direction, between group-affiliated and non-group firms within and across 
countries…. This suggests that the nature of business groups varies across 
country and institutional environments, and that this variation substantially 
affects the outcomes of their affiliated firms' diversification (p. 117). 
 
The above statement suggests that it is important to conduct more research in 
different countries and institutional environments to capture the 'contextual 
variations' that can contribute to the improved understanding of the role of family 
business groups in affecting the outcomes of diversification in different countries. 
Khanna and Yafeh (2007), who perform a comprehensive review of the business 
group literature, also concur with Chakrabarti's et al. (2007) findings that the 
performance of business groups is connected to the specific institutional 
environment in which they evolve. Singh, Nejadmalayeri and Mathur (2007) 
argue that a firm's diversification-performance link will be moderated by it being 
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part of a large business group because of the possibility of greater information 
asymmetries, conflicts of interest among member firms, inefficient investment 
plans and cross-subsidisation in large business groups.   
 
According to Chakrabarti et al. (2007), business groups as a network type 
of organisation tend to diversify themselves by having affiliates operating in 
various industries. Chakrabarti et al. (2007) state that "to the extent that 
diversified groups act as internal markets for affiliated firms, there might be less 
need and fewer benefits to affiliates diversifying themselves" (p. 102). However, 
they also mention that using readily available group resources may improve the 
outcomes of diversification made at the individual firm level. Both anecdotal and 
empirical evidence shows that member firms in the group diversify (Chang & 
Hong, 2002). "Because of the expectation that diversification occurs at the group 
level and not at the individual firm level" (Chakrabarti et al., 2007, p. 102), it is 
thus intriguing to find out how firm-level diversification can be affected by group 
affiliation in emerging economies. 
 
Are group-affiliated firms more efficient and perform better in 
diversification compared to non-group firms? Will member firms in the group 
benefit more or less from diversifying than non-group firms? Chakrabarti et al. 
(2007) provide some views on the above questions. Among the advantages of 
firm-level diversification in business groups according to them are: Firstly, 
member firms in the group may be able to diversify effectively by taking 
advantage of 'spillovers' from resource transfers within the group. Secondly, 
group affiliation may provide "reputation benefits and privileged access" 
(Chakrabarti et al., 2007, p. 106), which enable member firms to mobilise 
resources more easily or at lower prices from external parties. Finally, member 
firms may also gain from the spillover effects of the development of "greater 
managerial and organisational sophistication and resources" (Chakrabarti et al., 
2007, p. 106) that are expected to occur at the group level. Kim, Hoskisson and 
Wan (2004) find evidence that keiretsu (Japanese business groups)-affiliated 
firms benefit from keiretsu's internal market when they pursue diversification 
compared to independent Japanese firms, which generally do not perform well 
following diversification. Through diversification, business groups are also able 
to reduce risk and uncertainty in the operation of member firms (Joh, 2003). This 
has the effect of reducing default and bankruptcy risks.       
  
On the contrary, the inefficient transfer of resources in business groups 
could cause a group-affiliated firm to relinquish potential investment 
opportunities if funds/resources are used by the controlling family to subsidise 
weaker affiliates in the group. Moreover, Lins and Servaes (2002), who examine 
the value of corporate diversification in seven emerging markets (including 
Malaysia), find that diversified firms are traded at a discount of 7% compared to 
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focused firms, and more importantly, the discounts are mainly from group-
affiliated diversified firms and less from independent (non-group) diversified 
firms. They contend that because business groups are able to capture the benefits 
of diversification through group diversification, there are few reasons for 
individual firm diversification within groups. Thus, the choice to diversify in 
member firms is more likely an act of expropriation (Lins & Servaes, 2002). 
Business groups may use their member firms for excessive diversification that 
fulfils a personal or family agenda at the expense of firm efficiency and 
performance (Backman, 1999; Young et al., 2008). As such, agency problems 
can be more serious among these firms, especially in countries such as Malaysia 
where the enforcement of the legal and regulatory systems are weak and 
politicians and businessmen collude to create private benefits (Claessens & Fan, 
2002; Low, 2004; Gomez, 2006; Gunasegaram, 2007). The inverse impact of 
firm diversification on performance could therefore be worse in these firms 
compared to non-group firms.  
 
Why would member firms in a group diversify when their group can 
perform the task more effectively? According to Chakrabarti et al. (2007), the 
research has paid little attention to questions that are related to firm-level 
diversification in business groups, most likely because past research has been 
"implicitly relying on the proposition that group diversification substitutes for 
and precludes affiliated-firm diversification" (Chakrabarti et al., 2007, p. 106). It 
is thus the intention of this study to fill the gap in the literature to respond to the 
above question.     
 
From the above discussion, it is believed that the disadvantages of group 
affiliation outweigh its advantages in influencing the outcomes of firm 
diversification under the current context of the political-business environment in 
Malaysia. Thus, it is hypothesised that:  
 
H1:  The greater the firm diversification, the lower the performance 
of the firms. This relationship is more obvious for firms with 
group affiliation compared to firms without group affiliation.  
 
Moderating Effects of Group Size and Group Structure on the Performance 
Outcomes of Firm Diversification  
 
Not all business groups are alike. Business groups may have various features 
(group heterogeneity) that could affect firm performance differently (Khanna & 
Palepu, 2000a; Kim et al., 2004). For instance, the size or scope of a business 
group is one such feature. Larger business groups consist of more member firms 
and might therefore be associated with a more complex group structure involving 
the use of direct as well as indirect equity holdings via a pyramidal structure or 
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cross-holdings. Thus, this may impose additional governance issues, as indirect 
holdings via a pyramidal structure or cross-holdings are associated with higher 
control rights but lower cash flow rights for the controlling shareholders 
(Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000). This divergence of cash flow and control 
rights could lead to a greater inclination for the controlling shareholders to 
expropriate the minority shareholders. One such activity is to restrain dividend 
payments and invest free cash flows into questionable business diversifications 
for empire-building and enhanced private benefits of control. Lins and Servaes 
(2002) discover that a 'diversification discount' is commonly found in firms 
where there is a considerable difference in the management's cash flow rights and 
control rights.  
 
In addition, the complexity of the ownership structure of large business 
groups fosters a greater tendency of controlling shareholders to expropriate 
because the expropriatory activities or transactions that occur within the internal 
markets of business groups can be easily concealed and undiscovered. For 
instance, instead of paying dividends, the earnings are retained and reinvested to 
diversify and expand into various business lines. In such circumstances, as 
explained above, opportunities arise, particularly for large or structurally 
complicated business groups, to be involved in asset transactions that benefit the 
controlling families at the expense of firm performance and minority 
shareholders' interests [for example, using the target firm to purchase assets (as 
part of diversification activities) from the private companies owned by the 
controlling families at a price higher than the market rate]. As highlighted earlier, 
such expropriation activities could be more prevalent in business groups that 
have close political connections. It is believed that these political connections are 
more prevalent and clearly displayed in large or complex business groups 
(Gomez & Jomo, 1999; Searle, 1999; Nazli & Weetman, 2006; Sahoo, 2010; 
Yeoh, 2010). Accordingly, larger or more complex business groups may tend to 
engage more in the above-mentioned 'agency-driven' diversification, which 
would in turn negatively affect the performance of group-affiliated firms.    
 
A business group has a choice of whether to undertake diversification at 
the group or firm level. A smaller business group with a small number of firms 
(simple structure) may not be as diversified as a large group. However, the less-
diversified nature of smaller groups can be compensated for by increasing the 
diversification at the firm level. In other words, the affiliated firms can be used to 
advance the group's activities into different industries and business sectors. With 
this reasoning, a large or a structurally complicated business group is capable of 
proceeding with group diversification through its numerous affiliated firms that 
are involved in different industries (Chakrabarti et al., 2007). Therefore, the 
group does not need to undertake diversification at the firm level as much as a 
smaller business group does. Thus, in this case, firm-level diversification would 
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be negatively related to the size and structure of the business group, and this in 
turn would affect the performance of the firms in the group.  
 
In contrast, Khanna and Palepu (2000a) observe that the majority of 
small and medium-sized business groups in India do not have the "management 
skills, the internal processes, or the political connections to generate benefits 
from diversification" (p. 888). As a result, coupled with the poor monitoring 
institutions in India, these business groups are susceptible to serious agency 
problems, and consequently, the member firms of these business groups generally 
perform worse than the independent (non-group) firms. Moreover, large business 
groups have the scale and scope to internalise the costs associated with creating 
internal structures and processes more efficiently and are subsequently capable of 
creating added value for member firms (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a). In addition, 
larger business groups are conceivably more able than smaller business groups to 
offer 'valuable, rare and inimitable resources' to their member firms, which will 
in turn enhance the outcomes of the firms' diversification efforts and 
subsequently improve their performance.     
 
In short, group size and complexity could affect the way in which 
diversification is undertaken at the firm level. From the above discussion, even 
though larger business groups may bring some advantages that improve the firm's 
diversification outcomes, it is postulated that in Malaysia, a country with 
relatively weak enforcement of public and corporate governance systems coupled 
with a relatively small economy (where a large business group in Malaysia may 
not be 'large' in India); the influence of group size and group complexity on the 
performance outcomes of diversification is a negative one. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is proposed:  
 
H2a: The size of business groups moderates the effect of firm 
diversification on firm performance.  
 
H2b: The complexity of group structure moderates the effect of firm 
diversification on firm performance.  
 
 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION   
  
The sample in this study is based on the 2008 data of 632 publicly listed firms on 
the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia.1 All publicly listed firms are classified by 
Bursa Malaysia into 'sectors' based on their core business. This sector 
classification enables sector effects to later be taken into account in the regression 
analysis. Companies from the Second Board were excluded from the selection 
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because the listing requirements of the Second Board are different from the Main 
Board, rendering them incomparable.  
 
Of the 11 sectors that were identified by Bursa Malaysia, 4 sectors, 
namely 'Finance', 'Hotels', 'Mining' and Infrastructure Project Companies ('IPC') 
were excluded from the study. The finance sector is excluded from the study 
because firms in this sector are governed by a different set of rules and 
regulations, which makes them incomparable to firms in other sectors. The 
exclusion of the finance sector is also consistent with previous studies in this area 
(for instance in Claessens et al., 2006; Jiraporn, Kim, Davidson, & Singh,  2006; 
Zuaini & Napier, 2006; Andres, 2008; Estrin, Poukliakova, & Shapiro, 2009). 
The other three sectors were excluded because the number of firms in each sector 
is too small to provide any meaningful analysis. The remaining 565 firms were 
from the 7 core sectors, namely, the 'Consumer Products', 'Industrial Products', 
'Technology', 'Properties', 'Trading', 'Plantations', and 'Construction' sectors.    
 
This study uses Krejcie and Morgan's (1970) method as a starting point 
for determining a suitable sample size based on the total number of firms.2 The 
final sample of 314 firms in this study is derived based on the selection process, 
as shown in Table 1. The advantage of the above process of data sampling is that 
it ensures that all 7 core sectors in the stock exchange are included, with the 
number of observations in each sector as proportionate as possible to the actual 
number of firms in each sector of the stock exchange. It also ensures that firms of 
various sizes are satisfactorily covered in the sample.   
 
Table 1 
Selection process of sample 
 
Description  Number of firms 
 Total number of listed firms on Bursa Malaysia (Main Board) 
as of September2008 
632 
less Finance, IPC, Hotel and Mining sectors  67 
 Remaining firms in the main board 565 
 Firms stratified into sectors and two-thirds selected from each 
sector using systematic sampling   
379 
 
less Firms whose largest ultimate owner is NOT family or 
individual  (state, foreign firms, widely held firms and firms 
without ultimate owners)    
65 
 Final sample  314 
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VARIABLES 
  
Firm Diversification Variables 
 
Firm diversification data used in this study are based on information in the 
'Segmental Disclosure' in 'Notes to the Financial Statements' of company annual 
reports. Ayoib, Ishak and Manaf (2003) and Zuaini and Napier (2006) also use 
segmental disclosures in annual reports to measure the diversification of firms in 
Malaysia. All publicly listed firms in Malaysia are required by the Malaysian 
Companies Act 1965 to disclose their revenues and profits before taxes for each 
segment of business in which they are involved. The disclosure of the business 
segment must abide by the FRS114 (Segment Reporting) issued by the Malaysian 
Accounting Standard Board (MASB).3 Specifically, following FRS114 (Segment 
Reporting), publicly listed firms are required to report information for business 
and geographical segments whose revenue, assets or net profit is at least 10% or 
more of the total consolidated amount.  
 
Due to controversy surrounding the appropriateness of different measures 
of firm diversification as highlighted by Robins and Wiersema (2003), this study 
employs several types of diversification measures to improve the robustness of 
the findings. The use of several measures of diversification is also consistent with 
previous studies such as those by Lee, Peng and Lee (2008) and Denis, Denis and 
Sarin (1997).  
 
The following measures of diversification are used in this study: 
 
(i) Dummy variable – firms are classified as 'diversified' or 'focused' based 
on the number of segments disclosed. Firms that fulfil the following 
conditions are classified as diversified: with more than a single segment 
and where the sales in the largest segment are less than 90% of total 
sales. Firms that do not fulfil the conditions are classified as focused 
(Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 1999; Lins & Servaes, 2002; Fauver 
& Naranjo, 2003). 
 
(ii) The number of business segments as disclosed in the annual reports. This 
measure is used in Denis et al. (1997) and Zuaini and Napier (2006). 
   
(iii) The Herfindahl (H) Index – constructed from sales and a common 
measure used in many previous studies examining diversification issues 
(such as Lang & Stulz, 1994; Denis et al., 1997; Chen & Ho, 2000).  
  
Group Affiliation and Diversification Performance 
91 
(iv) The entropy measure – introduced by Jacquemin and Berry (1979) and 
Palepu (1985), also widely used by previous studies, for instance, by 
Singh et al. (2007), Chakrabarti et al. (2007) and Kim et al. (2004).    
 
The H index is calculated as follows for each firm i: 
 
H = Σ(sales per segment/total sales)2 
 
The H Index ranges from 0 to 1. The closer an H Index is to 1, the more a 
firm's sales are concentrated within a few of its segments, and the closer it is to 0, 
the greater the firm diversification is. 
Entropy (E) is calculated as follows for each firm i: 
 
 
1
ln(1 / )
n
i
i
E Pi P
=
=∑  
 
where Pi is the ith business segment's sales divided by the firm's total sales, and n 
is number of the firm's business segments. ln (1/Pi) is the logarithm of the inverse 
of a business segment's sales over the total sales. The higher the E, the greater the 
firm diversification.   
Group Affiliation Variable 
  
Group-affiliated firms are defined in this study as firms that are under the control 
of the same/common controlling family. Control can be achieved by the 
controlling family by either the direct or indirect holding of shares through 
another firm(s) (which can be publicly listed or privately held).4 The criterion 
used to define a firm as family-controlled is based on the '10% cut-off level' 
definition used in two often-cited influential studies: La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes 
and Shleifer (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000). A family or an individual5 is 
considered as the 'controlling family' when they collectively hold at least a 10% 
cut-off level of the total shares of the firm and serve as the largest shareholder of 
the firm.6 Listed firms that share the same ultimate controlling owner are 
considered as affiliated with the same business group.  
  
Information on whether a firm is affiliated with a business group can be 
traced from the firm's annual reports under the sections 'Corporate Structure' and 
'Directors' Profile' (for some business groups, some of their affiliated firms have 
the name of the group as part of their names and thus can be easily identified, for 
instance, Lion Diversified, Lion Industries, Lion Firm and Lion Forest Industries 
are firms affiliated with the Lion Group). Firms are required to disclose in their 
annual report (usually in the 'Directors' Profile' section) whether a board director 
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also holds a directorship in another firm(s), and the name of that firm must be 
disclosed if it is publicly listed. These disclosures enable the researcher to link 
firms that are affiliated with one director. Firms affiliated with the same business 
group can then be identified once it is confirmed that the director is a member of 
the controlling family. It is found that most members of controlling families with 
multiple directorships in more than one listed firm are directors occupying senior 
positions such as board chairman, vice chairman or managing director/CEO.  
 
Firm Performance Variables 
 
Due to the lack of consensus in the literature with regard to the choice of firm 
performance measures, it is thus difficult to identify a single indicator for firm 
performance. This study opts to use both accounting-based return on assets 
(ROA) and the stock-market-based simplified Tobin's Q as the proxies to 
measure firm performance. The use of alternate measures is intended to help 
verify the robustness of the results (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Both measures are 
widely used as the only performance measures in previous studies (such as in 
Khanna & Palepu, 2000a; Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; 
George & Kabir, 2008; Andres, 2008; Masulis, Pham, & Zein, 2011).  
 
For the ROA data, due to the presence of extreme values at both 
extremes of the data (very high negative and positive ROA values), the data are 
winsorised at its 1st and 99th percentiles. In contrast, for the data of simplified 
Tobin's Q, due to the presence of extreme values only at one extreme of the data 
(very high positive Q values),7 winsorisation is applied only to the extreme 
positive values. Winsorisation has the advantage of correcting the skewness in 
the distribution of the data and improving their statistical properties (such as 
normality) (Salkind, 2010). It also "preserves the information that a case had 
among the highest (or lowest) values in a distribution but protects against some 
of the harmful effects of outliers" (Salkind, 2010, p. 1637). The method to 
winsorise data at their 1st and 99th percentiles is used, for instance, by Guest and 
Sutherland (2010) in their study of business group affiliation and firm 
performance in China. Chen and Chen (2012) winsorise their data at the 5th and 
95th percentiles in their study of how various aspects of corporate governance 
structures affect the resource allocation efficiency of diversified firms.      
 
Other Control Variables 
 
This study includes several other control variables that are considered important 
in affecting firm performance. These variables are firm size, firm age, the gearing 
ratio and sector classification. They are frequently used as control variables in 
multiple regression analyses in the relevant literature. For instance, the control 
variables used by Khanna and Palepu (2000a), Douma, George and Kabir (2006) 
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and George and Kabir (2008) are very similar to those mentioned above. It 
should be noted that a broad range of sector classifications as per Bursa 
Malaysia's sector classification system are used due to the reliability issue of 
classifying Malaysian firms into more refined groupings using such coding 
systems as the SIC. This is also consistent with common practice in the literature 
involving Malaysian firms (for instance, by Tam & Tan, 2007 and Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2006). Sectors are dummy-coded for the purpose of regression analysis 
where one of the sectors serves as the control.   
 
 
METHODS AND MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
 
Multiple regressions based on the ordinary least square (OLS) estimation 
technique are used to test the hypotheses in this study. Masulis et al. (2011), 
Claessens et al. (2006), and Khanna and Palepu (2000a) also rely on OLS in their 
analyses. OLS is appropriate, as it is the most straightforward regression 
technique, and the estimation is reliable as long as common regression problems 
are accounted for. All issues commonly associated with regression, such as 
normality, multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity, are addressed in the study 
using appropriate steps or measures. Moderated regression analysis (MRA) is 
also used in this study whenever suitable to predict the moderating effects of an 
independent variable on firm performance.  
 
The following regression specification is used separately to test the 
hypothesis of whether the negative influence of firm diversification on firm 
performance is more prevalent in group-affiliated firms than in non-group firms 
(Hypothesis 1):   
 
PERMi = α + υ DVSFi + θ Xi + εi    (Specification 1) 
 
where: PERM refers to firm performance as measured by ROA and Tobin's Q; 
DVSF is firm diversification measured by the four diversification measures, 
respectively, as stated earlier: Diversification Dummy, Number of Business 
Segments, H Index, and Entropy. The focus is on the coefficient value, υ, in 
which a positive value for υ (for H index) or a negative value for υ (for the 
'Diversification Dummy', 'Number of Segments' and 'Entropy' measures) is an 
indication of a negative association between the level of firm diversification and 
performance, and vice versa. X is a vector of control variables, as stated earlier. 
Alpha (α) is the constant term, ε is the error term and subscript i denotes 
individual firms. θ is the corresponding vector of the estimated coefficient for the 
control variables. 
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The next regression specification is used to test the hypothesis on the 
moderating effect of the size of the business group on the firm diversification-
performance link: 
 
PERMi = α + υ DVSFi + ζ GRSZ +β GRSZ*DVSFi + θ Xi + εi 
 
                                       (Specification 2) 
 
where: GRSZ is a dummy variable for group size, which consists of three 
categories of group sizes: GR_A for firms affiliated with small business groups 
that consist of only two publicly listed firms; GR_B for firms affiliated with 
medium business groups that consist of three to four publicly listed firms; and 
GR_C for firms affiliated with large business groups that consist of five or more 
publicly listed firms. ζ refers to the estimated coefficient for GRSZ. The 
categorisation of group size in this case is somewhat arbitrary, as in Khanna and 
Palepu (2000a). The moderating effects of different sizes of business groups on 
the diversification-performance link can be determined from the coefficients υ 
and β. Different regression models using different group sizes are employed in 
the specification. 
 
The last regression specification is used to test the hypothesis on the 
moderating effect of the complexity of the group structure on the firm 
diversification-performance link: 
 
PERMi = α + υ DVSFi + ζ GRSTRUC +β GRSTRUC*DVSFi + θ Xi + εi 
                     
(Specification 3) 
 
where: GRSTRUC is a dummy variable for the complexity of the group 
ownership structure, which consists of three levels of complexity: BG_S for firms 
affiliated with simple business groups without a pyramidal structure; BG_PS for 
firms affiliated with business groups with a pyramidal structure; and BG_CS for 
firms affiliated with business groups with a somewhat more complicated 
pyramidal structure. In BG_S, the controlling family is the largest shareholder 
that owns an equity stake of the publicly listed firms directly or indirectly 
(through their privately held firms). There is no pyramidal structure involving 
publicly listed firms in the group. In BG_PS, there is at least one publicly listed 
firm in the group that is indirectly controlled by the family through another (one) 
publicly listed firm. In BG_CS, there is at least one publicly listed firm in the 
group that is simultaneously controlled by two or more other publicly listed firms 
belonging to the same group in which these firms are controlled by an ultimate 
controlling family. 
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
 
For ease of reference, a list of abbreviations used in this study, together with a 
definition/explanation, is presented in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 
List of abbreviations, variables and operationalisation   
 
Abbreviation Variable Operationalisation 
ROA Return on Assets  EBITDA / Total assets 
Tobin's Q or Q Simplified Tobin's Q (Market value of equity + Book value of total liability) 
/ Book value of assets 
GR_A Small-sized business 
group 
Dummy is 1 if the firm is affiliated with a business 
group with only two publicly listed affiliates; 0 
otherwise.   
GR_B Intermediate-sized 
business group 
Dummy is 1 if the firm is affiliated with a business 
group with three to four publicly listed affiliates; 0 
otherwise.  
GR_C Large-sized business 
group 
Dummy is 1 if the firm is affiliated with a business 
group with five or more publicly listed affiliates; 0 
otherwise.  
BG_S Business Group with a 
Simple Structure  
Dummy is 1 if the firm is affiliated with a business 
group without a pyramidal structure; 0 otherwise. 
BG_PS Business Group with a 
Pyramidal Structure   
 
Dummy is 1 if the firm is affiliated with a business 
group with a pyramidal structure (at least one publicly 
listed firm in the group that is indirectly controlled by 
the family through another publicly listed firm); 0 
otherwise.   
BG_CS Business Group with a 
Complicated Pyramidal 
Structure 
Dummy is 1 if the firm is affiliated with a business 
group with a complicated pyramidal structure (at least 
one publicly listed firm in the group that is controlled 
by two or more other publicly listed firms belonging 
to the same group); 0 otherwise. 
E ENTROPY or E value E = ∑Pi LN(1/Pi) where Pi is the i-th business 
segment's sales divided by the firm's total sales. The 
higher the E, the greater the firm diversification. 
HERF Herfindahl or H Index  H = Σ(Sales per segment/total sales)2. The lower the H, 
the greater the firm diversification. 
NUM_SEG Number of Segments  The number of business segments as reported in the 
company's annual reports. 
DVSF_D Diversification Dummy  Dummy is 1 if the firm has more than a single business 
segment and where the sales in the largest segment are 
less than 90% of total sales; 0 otherwise. 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 2 (continued)  
 
Abbreviation Variable Operationalisation 
Group Business Group-
affiliated 
 
Dummy is 1 if the firm is affiliated with a business 
group; zero otherwise. A firm is considered as group-
affiliated if it shares the same controlling family with 
other publicly listed firm(s). 
Sales Total Sales Total sales or revenues in Ringgit Malaysia  
Gearing Gearing Ratio Total debts / total assets 
Age of firm  Age of the firm in years Number of years since the incorporation of the firm 
 
Notes: EBITDA = Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation 
 LN = Natural logarithm  
 
Descriptive statistics on the variables of the sample firms are depicted in Table 3 
below. To begin, the distribution of the corporation performance statistics is 
centred on the value of 9.19% (0.87) with the median of 9.07% (0.76) for ROA 
(Tobin's Q). The maximum value of ROA (Tobin's Q) is close to 53% (7.00), 
whereas the lowest value is close to –80% (0.33).  A  family  firm  of  an average 
size (mean value) in the sample generates approximately RM 813 million in 
annual sales. However, the median firm size is much smaller, at approximately 
RM 293 million. The large difference between the mean and the median indicates 
that the distribution of sales is skewed and not symmetrical. Thus, the statistical 
distribution is normalised by taking the natural log of the variable. The average 
gearing ratio is 23%, and the mean age of firms is 24.5 years.  
 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics  
 
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
ROA (%) 9.19 9.07 52.74 –79.76 9.18 
Tobin's Q 0.87 0.76 6.91 0.33 0.53 
Sales (RM '000) 813,623 293,335 14,665,369 8,740 1,524,205 
Gearing ratio  0.230 0.228 0.789 0.000 0.170 
Age of firm (years) 24.5 19 95 1 17.33 
Entropy 0.420 0.360 1.630 0.000 0.415 
Herfindahl   0.763 0.813 1.000 0.225 0.235 
Number of segments 2.690 2.500 9.000 1.000 1.598 
Diversification 
dummy 
1 = 153 firms 0 = 161 firms 
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The mean (median) values of the Entropy, H Index and Number of 
Segments are 0.420 (0.360), 0.763 (0.813) and 2.69 (2.5), respectively. As a 
comparison, Zuaini and Napier (2006) report a Herfindahl Index of 0.71 and an 
average number of 2.36 segments from their sample of 355 Malaysian firms in 
2001, whereas Ayoib et al. (2003) report an average number of 2.30 segments 
from their sample of 219 Malaysian firms in 1995. This suggests that the firm 
diversification scenario has changed little since before the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis (AFC). 
 
Table 4 describes the number of business segments among group-
affiliated and non-group firms as well as firms in the full sample. It shows that 
the percentages of firms operating in one and two business segments are higher 
for non-group firms compared to group-affiliated firms. Most of the diversified 
group-affiliated firms have three to four lines of business segments, whereas most 
of the diversified non-group firms operate within two to three business segments.  
 
None of the non-group firms operate with seven or more segments, 
whereas there are a couple of group-affiliated firms with seven segments and two 
group-affiliated firms each with eight and nine segments. There are no firms with 
ten or more business segments. The overall observations suggest that group-
affiliated firms may be more diversified than non-group firms. This observation 
is consistent with Lins and Servaes (2002), who find that group-affiliated firms 
are more diversified than non-group firms. 
  
Table 4 
Descriptive statistics – firm diversification data: Group and non-group comparison  
 
Number of 
segments Non-group firms Group-affiliated firms Full sample 
 Number % Number % Number % Cumu. % 
1 55 33.9 47 30.9 102 32.5 32.5 
2 37 22.8 18 11.8 55 17.5 50.0 
3 31 19.1 28 18.4 59 18.8 68.8 
4 26 16.1 33 21.7 59 18.8 87.6 
5 9 5.6 14 9.2 23 7.3 94.9 
6 4 2.5 6 3.9 10 3.2 98.1 
7 0 0.0 4 2.6 4 1.3 99.4 
8 0 0.0 1 0.7 1 0.3 99.7 
9 0 0.0 1 0.7 1 0.3 100.0 
Total 162 100.0 152 100.0 314 100.0 100.0 
    
Note: Cumu. = Cumulative  
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Table 5 shows the comparison of diversification measures between group 
and non-group firms. It presents the p-values of the t-test for the mean differences 
as well as the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for the median differences between 
group firms and non-group firms. The mean (median) values of Entropy for 
group and non-group firms are 0.47 (0.37) and 0.37 (0.34), respectively. The 
mean difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. The Entropy finding is 
also supported by the Herfindahl Index and Number of Segments measures (see 
the table). Overall, the diversification measures show that group-affiliated firms 
are more diversified than non-group firms. This is also consistent with the finding 
by Chakrabarti et al. (2007) that group-affiliated firms in Malaysia and Indonesia 
are more diversified than non-group firms, as shown in their study across six 
Asian countries including Malaysia. However, their study also shows that group 
firms in Thailand are more focused than non-group firms, whereas in Singapore, 
both types of firms are similar in terms of diversification. In their study of seven 
Asian countries, Lins and Servaes (2002) also find a significant difference 
between the percentage of group-affiliated firms in their sample that are 
diversified (31.5%) and the percentage of non-group firms that are diversified 
(25.8%). A similar conclusion is also reached in Claessens et al. (1999) and 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2003) study on minority shareholders' 
expropriation and firm diversification in East Asia.  
 
Table 5 
Mean and median difference of diversification measures between group and non-group 
firms 
 
Variable 
Non-group Group t-test Wilcoxon test 
Mean Median Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Median Std. 
Dev. 
p-value of 
mean 
differences 
p-value of 
median 
differences 
Entropy 0.37 0.34 0.36 0.47 0.37 0.46 0.048** 0.122 
Herfindahl 0.78 0.82 0.21 0.72 0.81 0.25 0.127* 0.171 
Number of 
segments 
2.44 2.00 1.37 2.96 3.00 1.77 0.004*** 0.020** 
DVSF_D 0.47 – – 0.50 – – 0.663  
 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
 
Table 6 presents the correlation matrix of the variables involved in the 
study. Overall, it shows that ROA is significantly correlated to Entropy, 
Herfindahl, Ln Sales and Gearing, whereas Tobin's Q is significantly correlated 
to Entropy, Herfindahl and Ln Sales. Based on the correlation coefficients in the 
table, Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) are also computed for the explanatory 
variables that exhibit significant correlations with each other, and the results 
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show that the VIFs for these variables are all below 5.00, which are within the 
acceptable range (Hair, Black, Rabin, & Anderson, 2010).    
 
Table 6 
Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
Variable Entropy Herf # Seg DVSF_D Ln Sales Ln Age Gearing ROA Q 
Entropy 1.00         
Herf –0.98 1.00        
Number of 
segments 
0.80 –0.73 1.00       
DVSF_D 0.84 –0.86 0.65 1.00      
Ln Sales 0.14 –0.10 0.18 0.11 1.00     
Ln Age 0.15 –0.14 0.12 0.15 0.17 1.00    
Gearing 0.10 –0.12 0.12 0.13 0.33 0.03 1.00   
ROA –0.14 0.14 –0.10 –0.09 0.27 –0.05 –0.25 1.00  
Q –0.12 0.11 –0.09 –0.04 0.30 0.01 0.09 0.61 1.00 
 
Note: Correlation coefficients greater than or equal to 0.11 are significant at p<0.05. 
 
The next two tables provide the descriptive statistics on group 
heterogeneity and diversification. Panel A of Table 7 exhibits the distribution of 
firms and business groups according to three different group sizes. The group 
size is determined by the number of listed firms in a business group. The highest 
percentage of firms (37%) are affiliated with GR_A (small business groups with 
two listed firms) followed by GR_B (intermediate business groups with three to 
four listed firms) (34%) and GR_C (large business groups with at least five listed 
firms) (29%). As for the distribution of groups across the three group sizes, the 
majority of business groups (41 out of the total of 80 business groups, or 51.25%) 
belong to GR_A, 28 groups, or 35%, belong to GR_B, and 11 groups, or 13.75%, 
belong to GR_C.  
 
Panel B of the table shows that family business groups with a pyramidal 
ownership structure are common in Malaysia; the majority of business groups in 
this study (45 out of 80 business groups, or 56%) are associated with a pyramidal 
structure (BG_PS). The number of firms affiliated with this type of business 
group is 90 (or 59% of group-affiliated firms). As for the business groups with a 
simple structure (BG_S), 32 business groups (or 40% of the total number of 
business groups) belong to this category, and the number of firms involved is 51 
(or 34% of group-affiliated firms), whereas the remaining 3 business groups 
(consisting of 11 firms) are categorised as having a complicated pyramidal 
structure.   
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Table 7 
Descriptive statistics – size and complexity of business groups 
 
Panel A 
Group size 
Firms Groups 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
GR_A – Small 56 36.84 41 51.25 
GR_B – Medium  52 34.21 28 35.00 
GR_C – Large  44 28.95 11 13.75 
Total 152 100.00 80 100.00 
Panel B 
Group structure BG_S BG_PS BG_CS Total 
Number of firms 51 90 11 152 
Number of business groups 32 45 3 80 
 
Table 8 shows the statistics indicating the diversification of group firms 
according to group size and group complexity. In terms of group size, firms in 
GR_B are more diversified than firms in GR_A and GR_C according to all 
diversification measures. The mean, median and standard deviation of various 
diversification measures in GR_B are statistically significantly (at various 
significance levels) greater than for non-group firms. 
 
Table 8 
Descriptive statistics – group size and group complexity with firm diversification 
 
 Mean Median Std Dev 
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Group size         
GR_ A 0.38 0.79 2.54 0.34 0.84 2.00 0.40 0.23 1.37 
GR_ B 0.58*** 0.68*** 3.42*** 0.69*** 0.60*** 3.50*** 0.49** 0.27* 1.84** 
GR_ C 0.44 0.76 2.95** 0.32 0.83 3.00 0.48** 0.25 2.02*** 
Group complexity        
BG_S 0.42 0.77 2.86** 0.37 0.81 3.00** 0.40 0.23 1.34 
BG_PS 0.48** 0.73* 2.94** 0.40 0.81 3.00 0.48*** 0.26** 1.93*** 
BG_CS 0.60* 0.70 3.55*** 0.34 0.81 4.00* 0.57 0.29 2.16 
Non-
group 
firms 
0.37 0.78 2.44 0.34 0.82 2.00 0.36 0.21 1.37 
 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Comparisons of mean, median and standard 
deviation are made with non-group firms. The mean difference is tested with the t-test, the median difference with the 
Wilcoxon test and the standard deviation difference with the F-test.  
Group Affiliation and Diversification Performance 
101 
In terms of group complexity, a general trend of diversification is 
observed in that the level of diversification increases as the business group 
structure becomes more complex. Specifically, non-group firms have the lowest 
level of diversification, followed by firms in business groups with a simple 
structure (BG_S), and then by firms in business groups with a pyramidal 
structure (BG_PS). Firms affiliated with business groups with a complicated 
structure (BG_CS) are the most diversified of all. This observation is inconsistent 
with the 'substitution proposition' that diversification at the group level (having 
affiliates operating in different industries) is able to substitute diversification at 
the firm level, and thus, group-affiliated firms do not need to diversify, as the task 
can be more effectively fulfilled at the group level (Charkrabarti et al., 2007). It 
is thus intriguing to determine whether there is a performance differential 
between more diversified group-affiliated firms and non-group firms.  
 
 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Influence of Group Affiliation on the Firm Diversification-performance Link 
 
It is observed from Panel A in Table 9 that when firms are split into group and 
non-group firms, generally, no significant relationship is found between the four 
diversification measures and the performance of non-group firms, but generally, a 
significant negative relationship is found for the group firms. Hypothesis 1 is thus 
supported.  
 
The finding is consistent with that of Lins and Servaes (2002) that the 
'diversification discounts' found in their study involving seven emerging markets 
in East Asia come mainly from group-affiliated firms rather than non-group 
firms. It is also consistent with the finding by Claessens et al. (1999) regarding 
nine East Asian countries that group-affiliated firms are associated with poorer 
diversification performance compared to non-group firms.  
 
This study thus far has shown that group firms are more diversified than 
non-group firms. The poorer performance of diversification, which is more 
prevalent among group-affiliated firms, suggests that these diversifications might 
be agency-driven. Moreover, as reasoned by Lins and Servaes (2002), this 
finding implies that because some of the advantages of diversification can be 
captured through a group structure, it is difficult for affiliated firms to justify 
their diversification, and thus, if they do diversify, the decision to diversify is 
more likely to be made by the controlling families to serve their own interests and 
not those of the minority shareholders.  
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It should also be noted that the findings in this study do not support the 
'spillover benefits of group affiliation to firm-level diversification' hypothesis (as 
explained in Charkrabarti et al., 2007) but are instead more consistent with the 
expropriation hypothesis. Claessens et al. (1999) find that the evidence of 
diversification discounts associated with group-affiliated firms in their study is 
consistent with their expropriation hypothesis.  
 
Moderating Effects of Group Size and Group Structure on the Performance 
Outcomes of Firm Diversification 
 
Further findings on the influence of group size on the performance outcomes of 
diversification are shown in Table 10. The key interest lies in the interaction 
terms involving the various group sizes in the table.  
 
Small Business Groups (GR_A) 
 
The findings regarding small business groups (GR_A) show that there is some 
weak evidence to suggest that GR_A may positively moderate the firm 
diversification-performance link (see the interaction terms in Model (1) and 
Model (4)).  
 
The moderating influence of GR_A can be computed by adding the 
diversification measure variable and the interaction term variable. For instance, 
the moderating influence of GR_A on the diversification-ROA link in Model (1) 
of Panel A can be computed as (ENTROPY + ENTROPY*GR_A) = –3.237 + 
4.225 = 0.988, which can be interpreted as follows: every 0.1 increase in the 
Entropy value8 of firms affiliated with small business groups will lead to an 
improvement of ROA of the firms by approximately 0.1% (0.1 × 0.988% = 
0.0988% ≈ 0.1%). Similarly, the moderating influence of GR_A on Tobin's Q in 
Model (4) of Panel D is computed as –0.108 + 0.263 = 0.155, which is 
interpreted as follows: a diversified firm affiliated with a small business group 
has 0.155 greater Tobin's Q compared to a similarly diversified firm that is not in 
GR_A.  
 
The findings on small-sized business groups thus do not support Khanna 
and Palepu's (2000a) observation that in India, the majority of small- and 
medium-sized business groups have issues such as incompetent management, 
serious agency problems and a lack of advantages of political connection that 
prevent their firms from generating benefits from diversification. This 
inconsistency in the findings could be due to the differences in the country-
specific and institutional environment factors in both countries, as these lead to 
variations in the nature of business groups in each country. 
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Table 10 
Firm diversification and performance – group size effect  
 
 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.  
The values in the table show the coefficients of the variables.  
All other control variables and sector effects are included in the regression (not shown above).  
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Intermediate and Large Business Groups (GR_B and GR_C) 
 
The findings on intermediate business groups (GR_B) show that GR_B has an 
insignificant influence on the performance outcomes of diversification (all of the 
interaction terms involving GR_B are statistically insignificant) (see Model [2] 
and Model [5]).  
 
The findings on large business groups (GR_C) show that GR_C 
negatively moderates the diversification-performance link. The moderating 
influence of large group size can be quantified as follows: as an illustration, the 
influence of GR_C in Model (6) of Panel B is computed as –0.036 + 0.435 = 
0.399, which can be interpreted as follows: for every 0.1 decrease in the 
Herfindahl9 of firms affiliated with GR_C, the Tobin's Q of the firms will decline 
by approximately 0.04 (0.1 × 0.399 = 0.0399 ≈ 0.04).  
 
This observation implies that the performance of firms deteriorates as the 
diversification level increases for firms affiliated with large business groups. In 
other words, the higher the diversification level of firms affiliated with large 
business groups, the more their performance and value will diminish. The 
findings do not support and are opposite to Khanna and Palepu's (2000a) findings 
in India that large business groups have more advantages that enhance the 
performance outcomes of firm diversification compared to small and medium-
sized business groups. The findings are consistent with those of Johnson and 
Mitton (2003), who state that there is a greater potential for the owner-managers 
of politically connected firms, which are likely to be found in large business 
groups, to misappropriate the firm's resources. A diversified structure undeniably 
facilitates such misappropriation.  
 
The Complexity of Business Group Structure  
 
The moderating influence of the three different levels of group complexity 
(BG_S, BG_PS, and BG_CS) on the diversification outcomes are shown in the 
interaction terms from Models (1) to (6) in Table 11.  
 
Generally weak evidence of the positive moderating influence of 
'business groups with a simple structure' (BG_S) is found in the study. Thus, the 
findings, albeit weak, might suggest that not only do small business groups 
(GR_A) have a potentially positive moderating effect on the diversification 
outcome; business groups with a simple structure (BG_S) may also contribute 
towards a better diversification-performance relationship. The absence of 
pyramidal and cross-holding structures in BG_S may imply a lower tendency 
towards expropriation and subsequently less value-destroying diversification. In 
comparison, no significant influence of 'business groups with a pyramidal 
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structure' (BG_PS) is found in the study, as all of the interaction terms involving 
BG_PS are statistically insignificant. 
 
Table 11 
Firm diversification and performance – group structure effect 
 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
The values in the table show the coefficients of the variables.  
                  All other control variables and sector effects are included in the regression (not shown above). 
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On the contrary, the findings indicate that overall, 'business groups with a 
complicated pyramidal structure' (BG_CS) negatively moderate the 
diversification outcome. The coefficients for all of the interaction terms involving 
BG_CS in Table 11 are negative on a reasonably statistically significant level. 
Descriptive statistics in the earlier section have shown that firms affiliated with 
BG_CS have the highest level of diversification among all of the firms in the 
sample. The finding here therefore suggests that the high diversification observed 
in these firms is more value-destroying than value-adding and may thus be a 
reflection and manifestation of the substantial occurrence of agency problems in 
firms affiliated with BG_CS. The controlling families of business groups may 
create complicated ownership structures to reduce the threat to their control, and 
consequently, their tendency to expropriate may increase as the group structure 
becomes more complex and as such less transparent.  
 
It should be highlighted that BG_CS, as defined in this study, is actually 
the smaller subset of GR_C (large business groups with at least five listed 
affiliates). Hence, examining the group structure serves as a robustness test to the 
earlier test on group size. The dummy variable BG_CS can be considered as not 
only business groups with complicated structures and complex networks that link 
the affiliates but also business groups with a large number of listed affiliates. This 
is particularly the type of business group that, according to Lins and Servaes 
(2002), should not have a high level of firm-level diversification because the 
diversification needed to create the benefits of internal markets has already been 
provided at the group level by the large number of listed member firms operating 
across various industries. Thus, the poor diversification outcomes of firms 
affiliated with BG_CS in this study are in line with the authors' observations that 
high diversification at the firm level in business groups is more likely to be 
agency-driven. The lack of transparency in firm activities including 
diversification-related activities due to complex group structures reinforces the 
observations concerning the agency-driven nature of diversification. Finally, the 
findings in this section provide further support to the earlier findings and 
explanations that the politically connected large family-controlled business 
groups do not help to improve the diversification outcomes of their affiliates.  
 
 
FURTHER DISCUSSION  
 
The Presence of Trends across the Moderating Influence of Various Group 
Sizes and Structures     
 
The findings in this study suggest the presence of an overall trend in the 
moderating effects of group size on the performance outcomes of firm 
diversification. Specifically, the moderating influence tends to be positive in 
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small business groups, neutral in intermediate business groups and negative in 
large business groups. A similar trend is also observed in terms of group 
structure, where the moderating influence tends to be positive for groups with a 
simple structure and negative for groups with a complicated pyramidal structure.  
 
 Possible reasons for this trend could be proposed as follows: first, when 
the business group is small (for instance, with only two listed affiliates) or 
structurally simple, firm diversification is able to complement and contribute to 
the task of creating internal markets in the group, and the affiliates enjoy the 
benefits brought about by those internal markets. This implies that without firm-
level diversification, there could be a capacity limit for a small or simply 
structured business group to create a sufficiently large internal market to benefit 
the group and the firms therein. In addition, small business groups as defined in 
this study have up to only two listed firms in the group. The group structure is 
therefore straightforward and, without any pyramidal structure, reduces the 
groups' exposure to expropriation through diversification compared to larger 
business groups. For instance, the move to diversify or to further increase the 
diversification level of a member firm in a small and simple business group 
cannot be as easily concealed and remains undiscovered as in large, complicated 
groups.  
 
However, as business groups grow from small to intermediate (groups 
with three to four listed affiliates), the 'complementary' role of firm-level 
diversification on the formation of the internal market of the group begins to 
decrease. At the same time, group structure becomes more complicated, and the 
divergence of cash flow and control rights can now be found in some group 
affiliates. Thus, the benefits and costs of firm diversification for such business 
groups may well cancel each other out and result in neutral effects on the 
diversification outcomes.    
 
Finally, as business groups progress from intermediate to large (with five 
or more listed affiliates), the motive of controlling families to diversify or 
increase the diversification level of member firms becomes questionable. Thus, 
as opposed to small business groups, agency-led diversification in firms affiliated 
with large groups will be more pervasive, as a large, more complicated group 
structure network provides a suitable condition for controlling families to 
expropriate through diversification. The low transparency that is often associated 
with large business groups helps to conceal the groups' activities (Khanna & 
Palepu, 2000b). Moreover, large and agglomerated business groups often have 
more complicated pyramidal structures, and thus, agency costs through 
diversification are greater, as the costs that controlling families incur will be less 
than any personal gain or utility from expropriation.  
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The Corporate Environment in Malaysia  
 
The corporate environment in Malaysia may exacerbate this situation, as many 
large business groups are closely linked either formally or informally to the 
ruling party or senior government officials (Gomez & Jomo, 1999). The negative 
outcomes of diversification associated with firms belonging to large and 
structurally complicated business groups may suggest that they do not take 
advantage of the political connections they have to improve the outcomes of that 
diversification. One possible reason could be that close political connections are 
used by controlling families to advance diversification activities for personal or 
family interests more than the interests of other shareholders. Personal interest, 
wealth, or utility gained by controlling families from diversification activities in 
this case outweigh the wealth that controlling families need to forgo due to poor 
diversification results (i.e., reduced firm performance), as elaborated by Lins and 
Servaes (2002).  
 
For instance, a firm affiliated with a large business group may choose to 
enter into a diversification deal involving a director or an affiliate (e.g., the firm 
may decide to acquire a director-owned private company operating in a different 
business sector10) who has close political contacts rather than an arm's length 
diversification deal even though the deal with the director or his crony is not the 
best deal. This is because the close relationship with the director may facilitate 
more rent-seeking activities for the controlling family and provide opportunities 
to secure future contracts, credit or other benefits from the ruling political party.  
  
 Finally, it is reported by Claessens et al. (2000) that in Malaysia, the top 
15 families control corporate assets worth 76.2% of the country's GDP compared 
to only 2.1% in Japan and 2.9% in the US. This percentage is one of the highest 
in Asia and implies that families with large business groups could be highly 
influential and 'lobby' the government into implementing policies that are in their 
favour and 'interfere' in policies that are 'unfriendly' to them, such as a stricter 
takeover policy that may hinder their self-interested takeover-and-diversify 
activities.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The evidence that diversification performance is worse in group-affiliated firms 
than in non-group firms is consistent with Lins and Servaes's (2002) and 
Chakrabarti's et al. (2007) proposal that there is a lack of valid reasons to 
diversify at the firm level when the task can be more efficiently fulfilled at the 
group level. In addition, the evidence in this study shows that the effect of firm 
diversification on the performance of group-affiliated firms is negatively 
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moderated by the size as well as the complexity of business groups. It infers that 
diversification is more detrimental to performance in firms affiliated with 
business groups that are larger and more structurally complex. These findings are 
in line with the viewpoints of La Porta et al. (1999), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes 
and Zamarripa (2003), Khanna and Palepu (2000b) and Young et al. (2008) that 
groups that are larger or that have more complex networks of affiliates are 
sometimes formed by the controlling shareholders to reduce the threat to their 
control and enable them to engage in unwarranted diversification.  
 
Moreover, business groups, particularly those large in size or complex in 
structure, are also more likely to be linked to the "political apparatus in the 
country (that) also insulate them from external interference and monitoring" 
(Khanna & Palepu, 2000b, p. 265). The findings in this study support the idea 
that firm diversification in such business groups is more likely to be associated 
with personal, family or political agendas to the detriment of firm performance. 
Poor corporate transparency in these business groups, which may have led to 
severe expropriation, implies that the size and complexity of business group 
structures is worthy of regulators' attention. Various incentives could be created 
by the relevant authorities to encourage business groups to retain a certain size or 
level of group structure complexity as well as a certain level of firm 
diversification.  
 
The knowledge from this study may help public investors improve their 
investment decision-making, particularly in the aspects of risk assessment. The 
findings suggest that firms affiliated with large and complicated family-
controlled business groups could be bound to a higher expropriation of resources 
by the controlling shareholders. Investors should by no means totally rule out the 
possibility of investing in these firms, but rather, they should ensure that they are 
fully aware of and have taken into account the risks associated with investing in 
such firms. 
 
One of the limitations in this study is that it does not separate firm 
diversification into related and unrelated diversification. Such separation allows 
the researcher to examine whether there is a difference between group-affiliated 
and non-group firms in terms of choosing between related or unrelated 
diversification. Such a finding may clarify why the diversification outcomes of 
group-affiliated firms are generally worse than that of non-group firms, as found 
in this study.   
 
Finally, due to its peculiar affirmative economic policy (from 1970- 
present), political interference in Malaysian business is wide-ranging, regardless 
of the size of firms or business groups. The attention paid by this study to firms 
affiliated with large and complicated groups only serves to indicate that political 
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connections may be more pronounced in these firms compared to other firms. 
Future research may want to take into account the unique political-business 
circumstances brought about by the affirmative economic policy by comparing 
family-controlled business groups with other types of business groups, such as 
state-controlled ones. This comparison may be able to shed more light on the 
links between the types of business groups, their political connections and the 
outcomes of their firm diversification.    
 
 
NOTES 
 
1.  The 2008 data used in this study indicate that the findings may be more reflective 
of the slower pace of Malaysian economic growth of 4.6% recorded for that year 
(due to the global financial turmoil) than the stable economic growth of around 
6% for the country. Though the economic climate of 2008 for Malaysia is not 
considered 'poor', it was by no means a satisfactory growth for the country. 
Future research may investigate the finding differentials under different 
economic conditions.  
 
2.  Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), for instance, also make use of Krejcie and Morgan 
(1970) as a guideline for sample size selection.  
 
3. The reporting and disclosure requirements of Financial Reporting Standards 
(FRS)114 are similar to the requirements of the revised International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) 14. The new standard International  Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) 8 (Operating Segments) is enforceable in Malaysia with effect 
from 2009.  
 
4.  Direct holding is often insufficient to determine who actually controls the firm. 
Thus, the 'ultimate owner' approach (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002) is 
employed in this study, which indicates that when the principal shareholders of a 
listed firm are themselves corporate entities, the major shareowners of these 
entities will be identified; then, the major shareowners of the major shareowners 
will be identified and so on until the identity of the ultimate owner is identified. 
This process can be cumbersome, but fortunately, as part of the disclosure 
requirements, family members who own the firm indirectly through their 
privately-held or publicly-listed firm(s) will be reported in the annual reports as 
having indirect holdings in the firm with the percentage of those holdings 
disclosed. This has eased the identification of family-controlled firms in this 
study.    
 
5. The inclusion of firms that are controlled by individual entrepreneurs into 
'family-controlled firms' in this study is consistent with previous studies, such as 
Anderson and Reeb (2003), Andres (2008), and Masulis et al. (2011).     
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6. Members of a family are seen as persons acting in concert. Thus the 
shareholdings of family members are aggregated and treated as shareholdings of 
the family to determine whether a firm is family-controlled or otherwise. Family 
relationships or kinship are disclosed in the company annual reports.    
 
7.  The fact that Tobin's Q cannot take a negative value leads to an extreme value 
only at one end of the Tobin's Q data.  
 
8.   Increases in Entropy equal increases in the diversification level.  
 
9.   Increases in the Herfindahl equals decreases in the diversification level.   
 
10. The firm diversification level increases after acquiring the private company from 
the director. 
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